We derive alternative sufficient conditions for the value of public information to be either positive or negative in a Cournot duopoly where firms technology exhibits constant returns to scale.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study the value of public information in a Cournot duopoly where there is uncertainty about the market demand and/or the cost function. We provide conditions that allow one to determine whether the value of public information is positive or negative. With every Cournot duopoly in a certain class, we associate a real-valued function (defined on a convex subset of the positive orthant of the real plane) whose curvature determines whether the value of public information is either positive or negative: if this function is convex (concave) then the value of public information is positive (negative). Using this fact we identified interesting subclasses of industries where the value of public information is positive (negative). We also show the usefulness of our results to determine the value of public information in specific applications.
There is a considerable literature studying the value of public information in general equilibrium. Hirschleifer (1971) shows that improving public information may make agents worse off ex-ante in an exchange economy where agents share risks.
Several papers generalize aspects of Hirschleifer examples -see, e.g., Marshall (1979) , Wilson (1975) , Green (1981) , Sulganik and Zilcha (1996) . In a recent paper, Schlee (2001) shows that in this context the value of public information is negative in any economy where there is a representative agent. Contrary to Schlee's result, in our context we can easily generate examples of classes of industries for which the value of public information is positive.
There are also a number of papers that study the value of information in a linear oligopoly. 1 Ponssard (1979) investigates this issue in an industry where there is uncertainty about the market demand, and where some firms are informed about the state of nature and other are uninformed. Vives (1984) studies the value of information under both Cournot and Bertrand competition in a duopoly where demand is uncertain. Also in a linear duopoly where firms are uncertain about their costs, Sakai (1985) investigates the value of information under a variety of information structures.
In studying the value of information in a Cournot oligopoly some difficulties 1 In a recent paper, Ottaviani and Pratt (2001) study the value of public information in a monopoly.
1 emerge. Specifically, the associated non-cooperative game with incomplete information may not have a unique and/or interior equilibrium. When the game has several equilibrium points, it is not clear which equilibria to compare. And when equilibrium is not interior, comparative static exercises are difficult as corner equilibria are characterized by a set of inequalities rather than a system of equations. Moreover, it is easy to produce examples of industries whose associated game has a unique and interior equilibrium, for which altering the firms' information structure by adding public information leads to a new game whose unique equilibrium is a corner equilibrium (see Example 3.13 below).
All the papers mentioned above circumvent this problem by directly assuming that the games associated with the industries under study have a unique and interior equilibrium, even though it is not difficult to find examples where this assumption is violated. Instead, we identify a class of Cournot duopolies (not necessarily linear)
with symmetric information for which the game associated to each industry has a unique interior equilibrium. This allows us to define the value of public information for any industry in this class, and study conditions under which it is either positive or negative. In addition, our model of incomplete information does not impose any restriction of the space of states of nature or on the character of firms' information.
In particular, our framework allows for continuous as well as discrete information structures.
There are other topics on information in oligopolistic environments that have received attention in the literature. Gal-Or (1985 , 1986 , for example, studies the incentives for information sharing, and Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2002) examine whether information advantages are rewarded in equilibrium. Studying these issues involves exercises different from those performed in the present paper. Determining whether a firm may have an incentive to reveal (part or all of) its information to a rival, for example, requires to compare the payoffs of the firm in two games that differ in the information of the rival. Or determining whether a firm with superior information enjoys greater profits requires to compare the profits of the firms in a (given) game. Our results offer no conclusion regarding these issues.
The model
Consider a duopolistic industry where two firms compete in the production of a homogeneous good. There is uncertainty about the industry's demand and the firms'
costs. This uncertainty is described by a probability space (Ω, F, µ), where Ω is the set of states of nature, F is a σ-field of subsets of Ω, and µ is a σ-additive probability measure on (Ω, F). (We interpret µ as the common prior of the firms.) Once the state of nature ω ∈ Ω is realized, the market demand, and the firms's costs are determined.
Write p : Ω × R + → R + for the inverse market demand function, and for i ∈ {1, 2} write c i :
about the state of nature is described by a σ-subfield F i of F; that is, given an event A ∈ F i , Firm i knows whether the realized state of nature is a member of A.
We refer to F i as Firm i's information field. A duopolistic industry with incomplete information is thus described by a collection I = ((Ω, F , µ), p, c 1 , c 2 ,
We now introduce the following standard definition from probability theory. Let T be a set. A family {x t } t∈T of random variables on Ω is called uniformly integrable
We say that a function f : Ω × R + → R is uniformly integrable if (2.1) for all x ∈ R + the function f (·, x) is F -measurable, and (2.2) the family {f (·, x)} x∈R + of random variables is uniformly integrable.
Throughout the paper we assume that the inverse demand function, p, and the cost functions, c 1 and c 2 , of any duopolistic industry with incomplete information are uniformly integrable.
Let I be a duopolistic industry with differential information. The Bayesian game associated with I is the collection
, where for each firm i ∈ {1, 2} the set of possible actions is R + , and its profit function
We refer to G(I) as the Cournot game with incomplete information associated with the industry I. In this game, a (pure) strategy for a firm i ∈ {1, 2} is an F i -measurable 3 function q i : Ω → R + whose first and second moments exist. We denote by S i the set of all strategies for Firm i, and by S = S 1 × S 2 the set of profiles of strategies.
Let X be an integrable random variable on (Ω, F , µ), and let G be a σ-subfield of F . We write E(X | G) for the conditional expectation of X with respect to G. Let G(I) be a Cournot game with incomplete information. A Bayesian equilibrium is a profile of strategies q * = (q * 1 , q * 2 ) ∈ S such that for every i ∈ {1, 2} and every
for almost every ω ∈ Ω. (Our assumptions on p, c 1 , c 2 and on the set of strategies of every firm guarantee that for all i ∈ {1, 2} and q ∈ S, and for every σ-subfield G of
Remark 2.1. Equilibrium condition (2.3) requires that at a Bayesian equilibrium every firm maximizes its (interim) conditional expected profits at every state of nature.
This condition is equivalent to requiring that each firm maximizes its ex-ante expected profits; i.e., condition (2.3) is equivalent to
for every i ∈ {1, 2} and every q i ∈ S i .
Proof: Clearly (2.3) implies (2.4). To prove the converse, assume that (2.3) does not hold; then there is i ∈ {1, 2} and q i ∈ S i such that
Thenq i ∈ S i and
In this section we study the value of public information in a symmetric duopoly; i.e., in an industry I where both firms have identical information (i.e., F 1 = F 2 = G) and cost (i.e., c 1 = c 2 = c). Thus, a symmetric duopolistic industry I can be described by a collection ((Ω, F , µ), p, c, G). (For economy of notation we do not repeat c and G.) We refer to the game G(I) associated to a symmetric duopolistic industry as a
Cournot game with symmetric information. 
Then G(I) has a unique Bayesian equilibrium (q *
Proof. For every ω ∈ Ω define the two-player game of complete information G(ω, I)
where each player i ∈ {1, 2} set of pure strategies is R + , and its payoff function
It is easy to check that under assumptions (3.1.1) − (3.1.4) the game G(ω, I) satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 2.3 of Amir (1996) and therefore has a unique Nash equilibrium, (q *
We show that the graph of the correspondence E is measurable with respect to the
Since for all (x, y) ∈ R 2 + the functions σ 1 (·, (x, y)) and σ 2 (·, (x, y)) are G-measurable, and for all ω ∈ Ω the functions σ 1 (ω, ·) and
where Q 2 + denotes the set of duples of non-negative rational numbers. Since the set Q 2 + is countable, graph(E) is G ⊗ B(R 2 + )-measurable. Thus, by the Measurable Selection Theorem (see Aumann (1969) and Theorem 1 in page 54 in Hildenbrand (1974)), there exist a G-measurable function φ : Ω → R 2 such that φ(ω) ∈ E(ω) for almost all ω ∈ Ω. Since for all ω ∈ Ω the set E(ω) is a singleton (because G(ω, I) has a unique equilibrium), φ(ω) = q * (ω) for almost all ω ∈ Ω, and therefore q * is a G-measurable function. Now, for each i ∈ {1, 2} and q i ∈ S i we have
for every ω ∈ Ω, and therefore
which by Remark 2.1 establishes that q * is an Bayesian equilibrium of G(I).
Uniqueness of q * follows from the fact that for all ω ∈ Ω the game G(ω, I) has a unique equilibrium.
It remains to show that for all ω ∈ Ω, q *
which contradicts Condition (3.1.4). Ifx > q * 2 (ω) > 0, then Firm 2's first order condition for profit maximization implies
And since p 0 (·, q * 2 (ω)) < 0 and q * 2 (ω)) > 0, we have
which contradicts (3.1).
Finally we show that q * 1 (ω) = q * 2 (ω) <x 2 . Since 0 < q * i (ω) <x for all i ∈ {1, 2}, the first order conditions for profits maximization imply
for all i ∈ {1, 2}. Therefore
and since (q * 1 (ω), q * 2 (ω)) is a Nash equilibrium of G(ω, I), we have q * 1 (ω) + q * 2 (ω) <x. Hence p 0 (·, q * 1 (ω) + q * 2 (ω)) < 0, and therefore q * 1 (ω) = q * 2 (ω) <x 2 . ¤ Throughout the rest of the section let us be given a probability space (Ω, F , µ). A symmetric duopolistic industry I is thus described by a demand and a cost function, and a σ-subfield G of F . Given a market demand p and a cost function c, define the binary relation º on the family of all σ-subfields of F as follows: If G and H are two σ-subfields of F , then
, and
(Here G ∨ H is the smallest σ-subfield of F that contains both G and H.)
The interpretation of the binary relation º is simple: Now, consider an industry where the market demand is given for (ω, x) ∈ Ω × R + by p(ω, x) = α(ω)f(x), and where firms' cost is c(ω, x) = β(ω)x, where α, β : Ω → R are F-measurable integrable functions. Then
Let p : Ω × R + → R and c : Ω × R + → R be given for (ω, x) ∈ Ω × R + by p(ω, x) = α(ω)f (x), and c(ω, x) = β(ω)x, where α, β and f satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 3.1. For every σ-subfields G of F consider the symmetric duopolistic industry I = ((Ω, F, µ), p, c, G). By Theorem 3.1, the Cournot game G(I) has a unique Bayesian equilibrium, which is symmetric. Denote this equilibrium by (q * G , q * G ), and the equilibrium profit by π * G . We say that the value of public information in the industry I is positive (negative) if for every σ-subfield
That is, the value of public information is positive (negative) if having better information does not decrease (increase) firms' expected profits.
Let f : R + → R + be a function satisfying the assumptions (3.1.1)-(3.1.3) of Theorem 3.1. Define 
determined by a pair (α, β) ∈ K(f ) and a σ-subfield G of F , and can be described as I = ((Ω, F , µ), αf, β, G). For every (α, β) ∈ K(f ) we denote by (q (α,β) , q (α,β) ) the unique equilibrium of the Cournot game with symmetric information associated with the industry I = ((Ω, F, µ), αf, β, F ), and by π (α,β) = αq (α,β) f(2q (α,β) ) − βq (α,β) the equilibrium profit. Also we define the function U :
, and let the function V : M (f ) → R be given by
Note that V is convex on M (f ) if and only if U is convex on K(f ).
where π G is the firms' profit at the unique Bayesian equilibrium of the Cournot game with symmetric information associated with the industry ((Ω,
Proposition 3.3 below is an analog of a well known result in Blackwell's model.
However, since the binary relation º defined in (3.2) contains Blackwell's ordering, the conclusion of Proposition 3.3 is stronger than that obtained in Blackwell's framework. F , µ) , αf, β, G) for some (α, β) ∈ K(f ) and some σ-subfield G of F. Let H be a σ-subfield of F such that H º G. By Remark 3.2, in order to prove that
we must show that
By Theorem 34.4 in Billingsley (1995) we have
and
It is also easy to see that
And since V is convex on M (f ), Jensen's Inequality implies
(3.9) and (3.10) imply
In order to show the usefulness of Proposition 3.3 to determine the value of information in a symmetric duopolistic industry we present several applications.
Let f : R + → R + be a function satisfying conditions (3. is a positive constant number. In every industry in the class I 1 (f ) the cost is known with certainty and only the demand is uncertain. Let the function V 0 : (0, f(0)) → R be given for y ∈ (0, f(0)) by V 0 (y) = V (1, y). Also let the function V 1 : ( , ∞), then the value of public information is positive (negative) in every symmetric duopolistic industry I ∈ I 1 (f ).
Our next proposition establishes that we can determine whether the function V is convex (concave), by checking whether either V 0 or V 1 is convex (concave). of Theorem 3.1, and assume that f is twice continuously differentiable on [0,x).
Proof. We show that for all (x, y) ∈ M (f ) the function V : M (f ) → R defined by (3.5) satisfies V xx (x, y) ≥ 0 if and only if V yy (x, y) ≥ 0. Let (x, y) ∈ M (f ) and let (q (x,y) , q (x,y) ) be the unique equilibrium of the industry I = ((Ω, F, µ), xf, y1 Ω , F ), and write Q(x, y) = 2q (x,y) . Then, for all i ∈ {1, 2} and q i ∈ S i we have
Therefore, uniqueness of equilibrium implies
Also the first order conditions for profits maximization imply
Thus, for λ > 0 we have
i.e., V is homogeneous of degree one. By Euler's Theorem
and therefore xV xx (x, y) + yV yx (x, y) = 0, and yV yy (x, y) + xV xy (x, y) = 0.
Thus x 2 V xx (x, y) = y 2 V yy (x, y), and therefore sign(V xx (x, y)) = sign(V yy (x, y)), and
Since the eigenvalues of the Hessian matrix of V at (x, y) are 0 and
The following remark is a direct implication of Proposition 3.5.
Remark 3.7. If the value of public information in every industry I ∈ I 0 (f ) (or I ∈ I 1 (f )) is positive (negative), then the value of public information of every industry Proof. Let f be a function satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 3.8 and let I ∈ I(f). By Proposition 3.5 we may assume, without loss of generality, that I ∈ I 0 (f ).
Thus the industry I is described by a collection I = ((Ω, F , µ), f, y1 Ω , G), for some 0 < y < f(0). We show that V 00 0 (y) = V yy (1, y) ≥ 0 for 0 < y < f(0), and therefore that V 0 is convex on (0, f(0)).
Let 0 < y < f(0), and let (q y , q y ) be the unique Bayesian equilibrium of the Cournot game associated with I. Write Q(y) = 2q y . We have
First order conditions for profit maximization imply
By (3.8.1) Q(y) is the unique solution to the equation
By the Implicit Function Theorem Q is differentiable on (0, f(0)). Thus, differentiating (3.11) we get
.
Direct calculation yields
V 00 0 (y) = −f 0 (Q(y))(Q 2 (y)f 000 (Q(y)) + 6Q(y)f 00 (Q(y)) + 6f 0 (Q(y))) 2(Q(y)f 00 (Q(y)) + 3f 0 (Q(y))) 3 . We now apply our results to some examples.
Example 3.10. Let f be given for x ∈ R + by f(x) = max
, where a 0 > 0, a i ≥ 0, and λ i ≥ 1 for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The function f satisfies conditions (3.1.1)−(3.1.3) of Theorem 3.1. Let G be a σ-subfield of F , and for 0 < y < a 0 = f(0)
let (q(y), q(y)) be the unique Bayesian equilibrium of the Cournot game associated with the industry I = ((Ω, F , µ), f, y1 Ω , G). Write Q(y) = 2q(y). Now, we have Let F 1 = {∅, Ω, {ω 1 }, {ω 2 , ω 3 }}, F 2 = {∅, Ω}, and let G = {∅, Ω, {ω 1 , ω 3 }, {ω 2 }}.
Then F 1 ∨ G = 2 Ω , and F 2 ∨ G = G. The unique Bayesian equilibrium of the Cournot game associated with the industry ((Ω, F, µ), p, c, F 1 , F 2 ) is (q 1 , q 2 ) where q 1 (ω) = q 2 (ω) = 20 for all ω ∈ Ω. Also the Cournot game associated with the industry ((Ω, F , µ), p, c, F 1 ∨ G, F 2 ∨ G), has a unique a Bayesian equilibrium, (q 1 ,q 2 ).
In this equilibrium we haveq 1 (ω 3 ) = 0, and therefore it is a "corner" equilibrium.
